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I. Introduction 
Advancement of the modern science changed our everyday lives to the extent 
unimaginable to previous generations. At the same time new technologies create novel legal 
issues which are to be analyzed in the context of our existing law and most notably the U.S. 
Constitution. One area of science that witnessed most rapid advances over the past decades is 
biology. Achievements of biology play a significant role in our lives. Similarly, the government 
came to rely on biology as well in carrying its basic functions such as law enforcement. 
One biological discovery that is of particular importance to law enforcement is the 
discovery of DNA. DNA is uniquely suited for the crime investigation - criminals leave DNA 
everywhere and they cannot destroy it, unlike fingerprints. Matching DNA from the crime scene 
with the DNA of criminals will allow police to determine who committed the crime. In order to 
achieve that there is a need to have the DNA of offenders in advance. To address this issue the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created Combined DNA Index System (COD IS), the DNA 
database, containing DNA samples from various offenders. 1 Evidently, the larger is the database, 
the more likely it is that a DNA sample from the crime scene will match a sample in the 
database. Additionally, more samples in the database means a greater likelihood of solving "cold 
cases". The scope of the DNA database was gradually expanded first to include those convicted 
1 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 399 (3d Cir. 2011). 
of violent offenses and then to persons convicted of any felony.2 Finally, twenty four states and 
the federal government amended their laws so that any person arrested for a felony must provide 
a DNA sample to the government.3 
DNA collecting statutes mandate collection without a warrant. 4 DNA is collected without 
connection with the crime for which the individual is arrested. This provision raised numerous 
challenges on the privacy grounds -arrestees and convicted offenders challenge them as 
violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful searches and seizures. 5 All Circuits 
upheld DNA statutes against convicted offenders based on their diminished expectation of 
privacy. However, there is a heated debate whether the same holds true for mere arrestees who 
have not been convicted of any crime. 6 
This paper will analyze the constitutionality of the DNA databases' expansion to include 
arrestees. Expanding DNA to arrestees is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. DNA 
seizure and subsequent entry into the database is a warrantless search. Warrantless searches 
absent individualized suspicion are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment unless they can satisfy 
either totality of the circumstances test or the special need test. Totality of the circumstances test 
balances individual's privacy expectations against legitimate governmental interests. Privacy 
expectations of the arrestees are undiminished, comparing to the ordinary citizens and outweigh 
governmental interests. Special need test requires existence of a special need beyond ordinary 
law enforcement. The stated goal of the DNA sampling is crime investigation i.e. ordinary law 
2 ld at 401. 
3 Michael Crook, Sacrificing Liberty for Security: North Carolina's Unconstitutional Search and Seizure of 
Arrestee DNA at 2(February 17, 2011), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=1763534. 
4 !d. 
5 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 401. 
6 John Biancamano, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and Their Fourth Amendment 
Justifications, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 619, 629 (2009). 
enforcement. The DNA sampling does not pass special need test because there is no special need 
in the sampling, only ordinary law enforcement. DNA collection from the arrestees doesn't pass 
either the special need or the totality of the circumstances test. Therefore, DNA collection from 
the arrestees should be declared unconstitutional. Part II of the paper will provide an overview of 
the DNA databases' expansion. Part III will analyze the Fourth Amendment challenges to the 
DNA collecting statutes. Part IV will show that the expansion of these statutes to include 
arrestees is unconstitutional. 
II. Expansion of DNA databases. 
The states began using DNA in crime investigations starting from 1989, with Virginia being 
a pioneer. 7 Since then all states and the federal government passed DNA collection statutes and 
established databases of DNA samples. 8 The scope of these databases has gradually expanded to 
include broader categories of people.9 First statutes mandated DNA collection only from those 
convicted of certain violent crimes. 10 Gradually the databases were expanded to include all 
felons, including those convicted of non-violent crimes, some juveniles, and arrestees. 11 
A. CODIS database 
Recognizing the potential of DNA to aid in crime solving and stimulated by desire to solve 
cold cases, the Congress passed the Crime Control Act (Subsequently renamed DNA Act) in 
1994.12 The Act authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to establish national DNA 
7 Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA A Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? 
What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 165, 166 (2006). 
8 Crook, supra note 3 at 2. 
9 Biancamano, supra note 6 at 628. 
10 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399. 
11 Id 
12 !d. 
database system- CODIS. 13 Each state has its own DNA system but they are required to submit 
all the data to CODIS as well. 14 CODIS consists of two databases - a database of offenders' 
profiles and a database consisting of the samples taken from the crime scenes. 15 When the 
sample from one database matches the sample from the other it results in a "hit" which indicates 
that the individual, who provided the sample, committed the crime. The system then notifies the 
agency that provided the sample that the person has been implicated in the crime. 16 As of 2010, 
the database contains 9,000,000 offender profiles and 300,000 forensic profiles; it is the largest 
database of its kind in the world. 17 
After the DNA sample is collected, DNA profile is created. 18 DNA profile is the sequence of 
the DNA molecule that will be entered in the database. Not all the DNA is sequenced but only 
three areas containing short tandem repeats (STRs) which do not code for any personal 
information about the individual, such as disease susceptibility.19 Most of the DNA sequence 
never enters the database.Z0 However government retains the entire sample indefinitely, raising 
the possibility that the entire genetic information can be accessed in the future.21 Each profile in 
the database contains the following information: 1) DNA sequence; 2) Agency that submitted the 
profile; 3) profile ID number; 4) information about the lab personnel, associated with the 
creation of the profile. 22 
13 !d. 
14 !d. 
15 Crook, supra note 3 at 8. 
16 !d. 
17 /d. at 9. 
18 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400. 
19 !d. 
20 !d. 
21 /d. at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
22 Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/ co dis/ codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet. 
The system's primary use is for the law enforcement purposes, including identification 
purposes, as evidence in judicial proceedings if otherwise admissible, for criminal defense and 
finally for use of the DNA profiles in research if all personal information has been removed.23 It 
is not used to collect any personal information about the individuals at the present time. 24 The 
DNA Act specifically provides penalties for the unauthorized database use.25 
The DNA is collected pursuant to the state and federal statutes. States are required to submit 
all DNA data they collected to CODIS.26 The DNA Act of 2000 required DNA collection from 
individuals convicted of "qualifying" federal offenses (mostly violent crimes such as rape or 
murder).27 In 2004 the Congress expanded the definition of the qualifying offense to include all 
felonies (including non-violent crimes) and in 2006 to include all the people who are "arrested, 
facing charges or convicted". 28 
The DNA Act provides for an opportunity to expunge the DNA profile of an arrestee who 
has not been convicted, although the process is quite lengthy: The former arrestee has to provide 
the government with a copy of the order that the charges against him has been dismissed or 
resulted in acquittal. If no charges has been filed the arrestee has to wait until the statute of 
limitations has run and even then the prosecutor can object to the expunging.29 In any event only 
23 DNA Act 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132 (West). 
24 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400. 
25 A person who knowingly discloses a sample or result described in subsection (a) of this section in any manner to 
any person not authorized to receive it, or obtains or uses, without authorization, such sample or result, shall be fmed 
not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for a period of not more than one year. Each instance of disclosure, 
obtaining, or use shall constitute a separate offense under this subsection. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135e (West 2006). 
26 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399. 
27 
"[Q]ualifying federal offenses," enumerated in the statute, included murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated 
assault, sexual abuse and other violent offenses. People v. Buza, 197 Cal. App. 4th 1424, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 
(2011), as modified (Aug. 31, 2011), review granted and opinion superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) 
(citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(l)(A) (2006). 
29 An arrestee must wait until the statute of limitations has run before requesting expungement; the court must then 
wait 180 days before it can grant the request; the court's order is not reviewable by appeal or by writ; and the 
prosecutor can prevent expungement by objecting to the request. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758. 
the DNA profile will be expunged; the DNA sample will be retained by the government 
indefinitely. 30 
B. State databases 
The states' statutes differ somewhat from each other but most are modeled on the Federal 
DNA Act.31 Each state maintains its own DNA database and is able to access data from other 
states through CODIS system.32 The major difference between the state and federal statutes is 
from what class of individuals the DNA is collected. 
Virginia was a pioneer in developing DNA databases. Its database is the oldest in the 
country, predating CODIS.33 Virginia also led the nation in the matter of database expansion. It 
was the first state to expand the database from convicted offenders to arrestees.34 Currently 
Virginia authorizes DNA collection from any one arrested in a connection with a violent 
offence.35 
California has a largest state database, consisting of over a million profiles. 36 It permits 
collecting DNA sample from all adults or juveniles convicted of a felony or a sexual offense.37 
Notably sexual offense includes misdemeanors as well.38 Additionally, it authorizes DNA 
30 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
31 DNA Act 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (2006); People v. Buza, 197 Cal. App. 4th 1424, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 759 
(2011), review granted and opinion superseded (Oct. 19, 2011), as modified (Aug. 31, 20ll). 
32 Maclin, supra note 7 at 166. 
33 Maclin, supra note 7 at 167. 
34 !d. 
35 Every person arrested for the commission or attempted commission of a violent felony as defmed in § 19.2-297.1 
or a violation or attempt to commit a violation of§ 18.2-31, 18.2-89, 18.2-90, 18.2-91, or 18.2-92, shall have a 
sample of his saliva or tissue taken for DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis to determine identification 
characteristics specific to the person. Va. Code Ann.§ 19.2-310.2:1 (West 2006). 
36 Biancamano, supra note 6 at 627. 
37 !d. 
38 !d. 
collection from all persons arrested for a felony offense. 39 Thus California allows in some form 
DNA collection from juveniles, arrestees and people who committed misdemeanors. 
Texas allows for DNA collection from all persons indicted for a violent offence and from 
those who are arrested for a violent offence if they have been previously convicted for one. 40 
Furthermore, if any state law requires a creation of a DNA record these results may be included 
in the state database. Evidently in Texas this includes DNA samples from civil paternity suits.41 
In sum, all states currently maintain DNA databases, forty-seven of them collect samples 
from all convicted offenders, thirty four collect samples from juveniles and twenty-four currently 
collect samples from mere arrestees. 42 Sixteen more states have legislation pending to include 
arrestees. 43 
C. Goals of the expansion 
The history of the databases represents is a clear trend of expansion. There are several 
reasons for this expansion: Desire to increase crime solving, accurate identification, deterrence of 
the recidivism, desire to avoid statute of limitations problem and financial motives. Most 
legislatures cite as the reasons for expansion desire to solve cold cases.44 The idea behind it is 
quite simple - the more samples are in the databases the more likely it is that they will match the 
samples from the crime scenes. Another often sited reason is exoneration of wrongly convicted.45 
Even if jury found defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt DNA sample from a crime scene 
may match a DNA profile of another offender, potentially incriminating the former and 
39 !d. 
40 Tex. Gov't Code Ann.§ 411.1471(a)(l)(A)-(I) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008). 
41 Biancamano, supra note 6 at 627. 
42 Crook, supra note 3 at 2. 
43 !d. at 3. 
44 /d. at 4. 
45 !d. 
exonerating the later. The third reason is prevention of recidivism.46 The person whose DNA 
sample is already in the database is deemed to be less likely to commit a future crime because of 
the greater likelihood of being caught. DNA sample from the crime scene will be matched with 
the sample from the database, thus implicating the offender. 
Finally, the expansion of the databases may be driven by financial incentives.47 Due to the 
present state of the economy the states are increasingly looking for additional sources of income. 
By expanding the DNA databases they are trying to attract governmental funding for the 
maintenance of the forensic laboratories.48 The DNA Act offers funding to the laboratories that 
have a backlog of untested samples. 49 This funding may be used not only for the actual testing 
of the DNA sample but for the maintenance of the laboratories, salaries of the personnel and 
research and development. 50 This scheme creates an incentive for the states to keep the flow of 
untested samples to keep the federal money coming.51These reasons led states to expand the 
scope of DNA collection to include arrestees. 
III. Fourth Amendment Challenges to DNA collection. 
DNA collection is most often challenged on the Fourth Amendment grounds. The Fourth 
amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is well settled that DNA 
extraction represents a "search" with the meaning of the Constitution. 52 In fact there are two 
"searches" involved. A search occurs when the DNA sample is collected and a search occurs 
46 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762. 
47 Crook, supra note 3 at 4. 
48 !d. 
49 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546 § 3, 114 Stat. 2726 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 14135a). 
50 Mark Nelson, Making Sense of DNA Backlogs- Myth vs. Reality, NA rtL INST. OF illSTICE SPECIAL 
REPORT, June 2010. Available online at http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/tcjiu/pdf/Marone2.pdf. 
51 Crook, supra note 3 at 4. 
52 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) reh'g en bane granted. 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011) 
and vacated, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 813). 
when the DNA profile in the database is compared to the crime scene profiles. 53 Additionally a 
search will occur every time the profile is compared to other profiles in the future. Not all the 
searches require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, only those deemed unreasonable. Thus, 
DNA sample extraction and the subsequent DNA profile analysis do not require a warrant if they 
are reasonable. 54 
There are two tests used to determine reasonableness of a search under the Fourth 
Amendment: The special need test and the totality of the circumstances test. 55 As evident from 
its name, the special need test involves existence of a special need for the search, such as airport 
security considerations. 56 The totality of circumstances test on the other hand involves balancing 
the individual's expectations of privacy against the governmental interests in the search. 57 
There was a split in the Circuits as to which test to apply to the DNA -collection statutes. 
Majority of the Circuits used totality of the circumstances test, while the Second and the Seventh 
Circuits used the special need test. The special need test became much harder to apply after the 
Supreme Court decisions in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond and Ferguson v. City of Charleston 
which held that the general need for the law enforcement cannot be a special need in the context 
of the Fourth Amendment challenge. 58 The stated need for the DNA collection is solving past 
crimes and preventing future crimes i.e. general law enforcement. 59 Hence, it would be difficult 
for the DNA collection statutes to pass the special need test.60 Additionally, the Supreme Court 
53 Mitchell~ 652 F.3d at 406. 
54 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1217(citing U.S. v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410, 414-15). 
55 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218. 
56 Crook, supra note 3 at 2 7. 
57 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218. 
58 Ferguson v. City ofCharleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
59 Solving crimes is clearly a normal law enforcement function. Because the "special needs" exception applies only 
to non-law enforcement purposes, and the State's interest here is the use of data for purely law enforcement 
purposes, the "special needs" exception is inapplicable. Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2009). 
60 ld 
decision in Samson v. California directs to the use of the totality of the circumstances test in the 
context of the DNA collection. 61 In this paper the DNA collection statutes are analyzed on the 
basis of the totality of the circumstances test although the special need test would be addressed as 
well to a lesser extent. 
A. Application of the DNA collection statutes to the convicts. 
There are two issues in analyzing reasonableness of the DNA collection from arrestees. The 
first is the collection of the DNA sample and the second is matching of the DNA profile with 
those from the crime scenes. 62 The issue of the DNA collection is analyzed in light of Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n. 63 Skinner held that collection of blood, breath and urine 
sample constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment; however the search is so minimal and 
non -intrusive that it is considered to be reasonable.64 DNA sample is currently obtained by the 
means of a buccal swab. 65 The buccal swab is even less intrusive procedure than blood sample 
collection, hence it is reasonable. 66 Additionally, blood and urine samples may be used to obtain 
the DNA sample. Therefore, the collection of the DNA sample is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The real issue in most of the cases is not the collection of the sample, but the creation of a 
profile for CO DIS system. Governmental possession of a DNA sample bears little consequences 
to an individual by itself, while the DNA profile can implicate him or her in further crimes.67 All 
Circuits faced with the question of whether DNA collection post-conviction violates Fourth 
61 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218; Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
62 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406. 
63 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1220 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, (1989). 
64Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625-27. 
65 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. 
66 !d. 
67 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1220. 
Amendment upheld the DNA collection statutes either on totality of the circumstances test or the 
special need test. 68 
1. Totality of the circumstances test. 
Majority of the circuits used the totality of the circumstances test.69 Under this test the courts 
weight the governmental interests against the privacy expectations of convicted offenders. The 
most often cited government interests are investigation of the "cold" cases, aid in the 
reintegration into the society and continuing supervision of the individual. 70 The government has 
a legitimate interest in investigating cold cases as a part of normal law enforcement. 71 
Additionally, DNA analysis helps exonerate individuals who are serving sentences for the crimes 
they did not commit.72 Collecting DNA samples will help deter recidivism. Those who were 
once convicted of a crime are more likely to commit another crime. 73 If their DNA sample is 
already in the system they will be easily identified when the crime scene sample is entered into 
the database. 74 Thus the likelihood of being caught will prevent the felons from committing more 
crimes and help their reintegration in the society. 75 Another governmental interest is a continued 
supervision of a criminal after being released on a parole or probation. 76 The individual on a 
supervised release still remains in the governmental custody, thus government retains a 
68 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760. 
69 !d. 
7° Friedman, 580 F.3d at 858, Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413. 
71 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413. 
72 !d. at 404. 
73 /d. at 424 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
74 /d. at 414. 
75 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762. 
76 Friedman, 580 F.3d at 858. 
legitimate interest in his or her person; the government has a legitimate interest in DNA use as a 
means of the continued supervision. 77 
On the other hand) weighting individual expectations of privacy all the Circuits held that 
convicts have diminished expectations of privacy. 78 The "watershed event" in diminishing the 
privacy expectation is the conviction.79 The individuals in the governmental custody cannot 
reasonable expect to hide their personal information from the government. 80 Therefore) their 
expectations of privacy are lower than those of the general public. Totality of the circumstances 
test balances governmental interests against individual expectations of privacy. In case of 
convicted felons) the governmental interests are very strong and the individual expectations of 
privacy are diminished. Hence, in balancing the legitimate governmental interests against the 
diminished privacy interests of the felons the governmental interests prevailed.81 Therefore, 
collection of the DNA from the convicted felons was found to be constitutional. 
The same reasoning held true even for those who were convicted of non-violent felonies. -
The event of conviction diminished their privacy expectations in their identity. 82 Regardless of 
the crime committed, because of the conviction and being in custody, any convicted felon can 
claim very limited expectations of privacy.83 On the other hand the governmental interests 
remain significant even in case of non-violent offenders: solving crimes and deterrence of 
77 /d.; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762. 
78 Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178 (lOth Cir. 2007); United States v. Castillo-Lagos, 147 F. App'x 71 (lith 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005); Kincade, 379 
F.3d 813; United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007). 
79 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 404, Pool, 621 F.3d at 1236 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 
80 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 404. 
81 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1236 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 
82 !d. 
83 Kriesel, 508 F.3d 947. 
.-.r . . , 
recidivism.84 Non-violent criminals leave their DNA at the crime scenes just as the violent ones 
do, therefore DNA collection from non-violent felons will aid solving past crimes and deterring 
recidivism as well.85 In balancing diminished privacy expectations of non-violent criminals 
against significant governmental interests, the governmental interest prevailed. DNA collection 
from non-violent criminals was found constitutional under the totality of circumstances test. 86 
2. Special needs test. 
Two circuits upheld DNA collection statutes as applied to convicts based on the special 
needs test. 87 Special needs test requires an existence of a special need beyond normal law 
enforcement. If such need exists the search does not violate the Fourth amendment. While 
general crime prevention and investigation is not sufficient to satisfy special need test, the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a DNA collection statute citing a special need of collecting felon's 
identification information. 88 Similarly, the Second Circuit cited a special need establishing an 
information database. 89 The Second Circuit noted that while the primary need for the DNA 
database is law enforcement, this need is nevertheless "special". 90 The need for law enforcement 
is "special" because it aims at uncovering evidence that is not detectable by the means of 
"normal" law enforcement.91 The Court found that there are no other means of establishing a 
database that will allow matching offenders with the evidence from the crime scene.92 Absence 
84 !d. at 949. 
85 !d. 
86 !d. at 950. 
87 Hook, 471 F.3d 766; Amerson, 483 F.3d 73. 
88 Hook, 471 F.3d 766. 
89 Amerson, 483 F.3d 73. 
90 !d. at 82 
91 !d. 
92 !d. 
of any other means makes DNA collection a "special" need.93 Thus DNA collection from 
convicted felons was found to be constitutional under the special need tests as well. 
B. Application to Arrestees 
Since adoption of amendments to the DNA Act that include arrestees and similar 
amendments to the states' DNA statutes there were several cases challenging the 
constitutionality of those statutes. There is currently a judicial split with some courts deciding in 
favor of the arrestees and some in favor of the government. Friedman v. Boucher, In re Welfare 
of C. T.L. and People v. Buza found extension of the DNA collecting statutes to arrestees 
unconstitutional, while United States v. Mitchell, United States v. Pool, Anderson v. Com. and 
Haskell v. Brown found it to be constitutional. 94 The matter is far from settled and some opinions 
are being withdrawn and superseded, as higher courts review the issue as evidenced by Pool and 
Buza. 95 In Pool defendant lost in the Ninth Circuit and petitioned the panel for en bane review.96 
However, two days before the argument was scheduled defendant pleaded guilty in the 
underlying crime rendering the case moot and the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion97• In Buza 
Supreme Court of California granted the petition for review, superseding the decision of the 
California Court of Appeals but it did not hear the case yet Nevertheless the analysis of the 
93 Id 
94 Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387; Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, Anderson v. Com., 274 Va. 469, 650 
S.E.2d 702 (2007); In re Welfare ofC.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), Friedman, 580 F.3d at 847; 
Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
95 United States v. Pool, 09-10303,2011 WL 4359899 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011); Petition for review granted. People 
v. Buza, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) 
96 Id 
97 We have been advised that Pool has entered a guilty plea. The parties agree there is no longer a live controversy, 
and the case is moot United States v. Pool, 09-10303,2011 WL 4359899 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011). 
subject matter in these decisions is important since other courts based their analysis these 
precedents.98 
1. Special need test 
The only case where the court applied special need test to the DNA sampling of arrestees is 
Fri.edman.99 The Ninth Circuit found the DNA collecting from an arrestee unconstitutional based 
on the special need test. 100The plaintiff in Friedman was convicted in Montana in 1980 and 
served its full term by 2000.101 He consequently moved to Nevada where he was arrested on 
unrelated charges in 2003. 102 After his repeated objections, the detectives forcefully obtained a 
DNA sample from him by a buccal swab. 103 In 2000, Montana did not yet require mandatory 
DNA sampling of the convicts and in 2003 Nevada did not yet require mandatory DNA testing 
of the arrestees.104 Hence there was no statutory authority for the DNA collection. The Ninth 
Circuit applied the special need test to the DNA collection.105 It reasoned that the only "special 
need" in DNA collection was solving crimes. 106 Solving crimes is general law enforcement. The 
Ninth Circuit found that general law enforcement is not a special need based on Samson. 107 
Hence the Ninth Circuit found collecting of a DNA sample from an arrestee unconstitutional 
98 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753. 
99 !d. at 853. 
100 Id 
101 Id at 851. 
102 Id 
103 !d. 
104 Although by 2003 Montana required DNA sampling of all felons, even if released prior to the statute enactment, 
the Ninth Circuit held that Montana statute did not apply to felons residing in the other states, such as Nevada. Id at 
854. 
105 !d. at 853. 
106 Id 
101 Id 
based on the special need test. 108 No other court applied special needs test to the DNA sampling 
of arrestees. 
2. Totality of the Circumstances Test 
All other courts applied the totality of the circumstances test based on the increased adaption 
of Samson. Totality of the circumstances test involves balancing individual privacy expectations 
against legitimate governmental interests. The individual expectations of privacy analysis 
includes the distinction between the privacy interests of general public, arrestees, detainees and 
convicts, fear of further use of the genetic information such as disease susceptibility and dignity 
interests. Governmental interests include crime investigation and identification of the person in 
custody. 
There is no consensus on the significance of arrestees' expectations of privacy. 109 All courts 
that considered the matter agree that the diminished privacy expectations of convicts do not 
outweigh legitimate governmental interests. 110 At the same time all courts note that privacy 
expectations of ordinary people outweigh governmental interests in DNA collection, which 
precludes government from collecting DNA samples from the members of general public. 111 
Thus privacy expectations of the arrestees outweigh governmental interests if they are above the 
privacy interests of the convict, closer to the privacy interests of the general public. The courts 
differ on how much weight to give individual expectations of privacy. Some find them 
undiminished, while other held that finding of a probable cause for an underlying crime 
108/d. 
109 Poo/621 F.3d at 1219; In re Welfare ofC.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 491. 
uo See, supra note 78. 
l1I Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 429 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
diminished the privacy expectations.112 Anderson court compared arrestees' privacy expectations 
in their DNA sample to those in the fingerprinting. 113 It found that arrestees have little privacy 
expectations in fingerprinting and, correspondingly, little privacy expectations in their DNA 
profile. On the other hand Buza court distinguished between DNA and fingerprinting, and held 
that arrestees have significant privacy expectations in their DNA profile. 114 Thus, courts disagree 
over the scope of arrestees' privacy expectations. 
The governmental interests on the other side of the balance include crime solving and 
identification of the person in custody. Crime solving is the stated goal of the DNA collection 
statutes as it allows matching of the DNA profiles from the database with those from the crime 
scenes. Another stated governmental interest is identification of the person in custody. DNA 
provides the most accurate means of identification since no two persons have the same DNA 
sequence. Thus, government asserts interest in using DNA sampling to determine who is in its 
custody. 
All courts agree that these interests apply to arrestees; however, the courts disagree on the 
weight of these interests. Some courts find that these interests are as strong for arrestees as for 
the convicted felons. 115 On the other hand, Buza court finds both identification and investigation 
interests significantly diminished in case of arrestees, based on Schmerber v. California. 116 It 
found that suspicionless searches are not permitted beyond convicted felons and that government 
conflates identification with investigation. 117 
II2 Poo/621 F.3d at 1219; In re Welfare ofC.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 491. 
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The totality of circumstances test involves balancing arrestees' expectations of privacy 
against legitimate governmental interests. The courts disagree both on the scope of the arrestees' 
privacy expectations and on importance of the governmental interests. Correspondingly, rn 
balancing one against the other some courts favor arrestees and some favor the government. 
IV. Extension of the DNA Collecting Statutes to Include Arrestees is unconstitutional. 
A. Special need analysis 
DNA sampling of arrestees does not pass the special need test because there is no special 
need for the sampling. In Friedman court found that the only asserted need for the DNA 
sampling of the arrestee is solving "cold cases"u8• Solving cold cases is ordinary law 
enforcement. Special need tests requires a "special need" beyond law enforcement and the Ninth 
Circuit in Friedman found that there is no such need in the DNA sampling of arrestees. 119 This is 
the only case decided on the basis of the special need test - it establishes a precedent that DNA 
testing of the arrestees is unconstitutional. 
Another potential special need for the DNA collection is the identification of the 
individual, although this argument wasn't raised in Friedman. 120 DNA presents the most accurate 
way to identify an individual since no two individuals have exactly same DNA sequence. All 
crimes have statutes of limitations - i.e. if a person was not charged with a particular crime 
within the specified time period, he can no longer be charged with it even if he is guilty beyond 
the reasonable doubt. Identifying the offenders by their DNA profiles allows the government to 
118 Friedman, 580 F.3d at 853. 
119/d. 
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avoid the statute of limitations problem.121 The individual is charged with a crime when his DNA 
from the crime scene is charged with the crime even if his identity is unknown at the time. 122 
This argument poses to create a special need of identification to include arrestees in the 
DNA database. Nevertheless~ this argument has in its core law enforcement rather than 
identification because the primary purpose is not to simply identify the individuals but to charge 
them with the crimes. This argument may identify a valid special need in the context of 
convicted offenders~ but not in the context of arrestees. The Supreme Court never permitted 
suspicionless searches directed at uncovering evidence of other crimes outside the context of 
convicted felons. 123 DNA sampling of arrestees to implicate them in crimes where the suspect 
was identified by his or her DNA is a suspicionless search. Therefore~ "special need" to toll 
statutes of limitations may not be a special need as applied to arrestees, because it is expressly 
prohibited by the Supreme Court. It is unlikely~ that this "special need" will pass the special need 
test. The DNA expansion to include arrestees fails the special need test. 
The only court that applied the special needs test decided in favor of an arrestee. There 
are no other plausible special needs that may justify collection of DNA sample from arrestees. 
The DNA sampling fails the special need test and should be declared unconstitutional under this 
test. 
B. Totality of the Circumstances test analysis. 
Totality of the circumstances test focuses on balancing privacy expectations of arrestees 
against legitimate governmental interest. Arrestees possess higher expectations of privacy than 
121 !d. at 659. 
122 !d. 
123 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 777. 
convicted offenders. These expectations are not outweighed by the governmental interests. 
Privacy expectations of arrestees are greater than the privacy expectations of the convicts 
because arrestees are entitled to the presumption of innocence, all DNA collection statutes 
provide for expungement of the DNA profile if the person is found not guilty, and there is no 
pervasive authority to support that arrestees have diminished privacy expectations. 
Arrestees' privacy expectations outweigh governmental interests because all the current 
statutes provide for expungement of the DNA profile after the charges were dropped, dismissed 
or the defendant was acquitted. This scheme suggests that the privacy interests of an individual 
who has not been convicted outweigh the governmental interest in storing the DNA profile. 124 
Arrestee is an individual who has not been convicted. Unless there is a difference between the 
privacy expectations of an arrestee and a person who has been found not guilty, arrestee's 
privacy expectations outweigh the governmental interests. 125 Because of the presumption of 
innocence, the privacy expectations of an arrestee are no different from the privacy expectations 
of an ordinary citizen.126 Therefore, arrestee has high expectations of privacy. 
Arrestees share the same privacy expectations as the ordinary citizens because they are 
entitled to the presumption of innocence. 127 A person is innocent until proven guilty; therefore 
privacy expectations of an arrestee are the same as of the ordinary citizens. Some courts draw a 
distinction between arrestees and the ordinary citizens based on judicial finding of a probable 
cause.128 The argument is as follows: finding of a probable cause is a "watershed event" that 
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differentiates an arrestee from the general public and diminishes his or her privacy 
expectations.129 
However this argument is flawed: the existence of the probable cause for arrest is not the 
same as existence of a probable cause for the DNA sample and it does not satisfy the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 130 This situation is similar to 
Schmerber. 131 In that case Supreme Court decided that the existence of a probable cause to 
arrest a person is not sufficient to take a biological sample from an arrestee without first 
obtaining a search warrant. 132 Only limited circumstances, such as the fear that the evidence may 
disappear justifies collecting the biological sample from a person· without a warrant.133 
Disappearance of the evidence is not applicable to DNA because DNA exists in every cell of our 
body and is recoverable long after death.134 Therefore, probable cause for arrest does not by itself 
diminish privacy interests of the arrestee. 
Additionally, the proposition that finding of a probable cause diminishes privacy 
expectations is undermined by the fact that probable cause is mostly determined by the arresting 
officer, not by the grand jury. Many DNA collecting statutes including the DNA Act require 
DNA sample collection as soon as practically possible135• This means that the DNA sample is 
taken at the initial "booking" of the individual, before he'll see a judge or a grand jury.136 The 
finding of the probable cause is made by the arresting officer. The finding of the probable cause 
by the arresting officer does not carry significant weight because it is not made by a "neutral and 
129 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1219. 
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134Lauren Frayer, Can Woolly Mammoth Be Cloned From Frozen DNA?, AOLNEWS (Jan. 18,2011, 10:25AM) 
http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/18/can-woolly-mammoth-be-cloned-from-frozen-dna!. 
135 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 766. 
136 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 427 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
detached magistrate". It does not diminish arrestee's expectations ofprivacy. 137 Thus, finding of 
a probable cause for an arrest is not determinative in assessing arrestees' expectations of privacy. 
There is no persuasive authority that arrestees have diminished privacy expectations.138 The 
courts that found diminished expectations of privacy rely heavily on the analogy to 
fingerprinting. 139 According to this reasoning once the arrestee enters into the custody he or she 
is a subject to standard booking procedures such as fingerprinting and photographing. The 
fingerprinting does not implicate significant expectations of privacy, so doesn't the DNA 
collection. 
However this analogy is based on a faulty premise. 14° Fingerprinting entered our life before 
majority of the decisions defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment, such as Katz v. United 
States; essentially no one has challenged the constitutionality of fingerprinting. 141 The 
fingerprinting cannot serve a model for subsequent judicial determinations of the 
constitutionality of the DNA statutes because it does not have any judicial determination itself.142 
In fact, the analogy to fingerprinting raises a question of whether fingerprinting itself violates 
Fourth Amendment. While fingerprinting of convicted felons may be explained by their 
diminished privacy interests upon conviction, the arrestees retain high privacy expectations of 
the ordinary citizens. Thus, there is no persuasive authority that the arrestees have diminished 
privacy expectations. 
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Another difference between DNA collection and fingerprinting is dignity interests of 
arrestees. 143 Fingerprinting is routinely used in many professions and is not seen as a "badge of 
crime". 144 DNA collection, on the other hand, is viewed as something reserved exclusively for 
the criminals, especially for the dangerous ones. 145 DNA collection infringes on the privacy of 
the arrestees much more than the fingerprinting does because it offends their dignity. 
Arrestees' privacy interests are greater than those of convicts because of the presumption of 
innocence. Finding of a probable cause for arrest does not diminish privacy expectations of 
arrestees in their bodily integrity. Analogy to fingerprints is false because there is no judicial 
basis for diminished privacy expectations in the fingerprints in the first place. Furthermore, 
unlike fingerprinting, DNA extraction is strongly associated with criminality. 
On the other scale of the balance lay governmental interests. The first and foremost interest 
stated by the government is interest in solving crimes. However, the interest in crime solving, 
does not carry much weight in the analysis of the arrestees' rights under the Fourth Amendment, 
unlike in context of the convicted felons, because it is a suspicionless search. The DNA 
collection is not done in connection with the crime for which the individual is arrested. 
Furthermore, DNA testing is not done in connection with any specific crime whatsoever. Thus, 
DNA collection is a suspicionless search. The Supreme Court never permitted suspicionless 
searches directed at uncovering evidence of other crimes outside the context of felons. 146 These 
are precisely the searches against which the Fourth Amendment is supposed to guard. 147 DNA 
sampling involves a physical intrusion. The Supreme Court in Schmerber specifically cautioned 
143 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 769. 
144 ld. 
145 !d. 
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against this type of searches: "The interest in human dignity and privacy < .... > forbid such 
intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence may be obtained."148 DNA sampling is a 
physical intrusion which is based on a mere chance that evidence of crimes may be obtained. 
While this may be a valid interest in case of convicted felons it is not so for the arrestees) 
according to the Supreme Court. Therefore) government does not possess a valid interest in 
collecting DNA samples from arrestees for investigatory purposes. 
The only exceptions where warrantless intrusions beyond the body surface are permitted are 
when the evidence may disappear, like blood alcohol content and to enforce prison security.149 
None of these circumstances is an issue in the DNA collection. The government does not allege 
any importance of DNA samples to the prison security; DNA is present in every cell of our body. 
It is settled that convicted felons have to provide the DNA sample150• Thus government will be 
able to obtain the sample post-conviction anyway and if the arrestee is found not guilty the DNA 
profile will be expunged. 151 The total impact of collecting DNA from arrestees is smal1.152 The 
government does not significantly benefit from receiving the sample sooner rather than later. 
Recent data suggests that gains of including arrestees into the database might be quite 
limited: Only one in forty criminal cases results in trial, while the rest of defendants plead 
guilty. 153 Those who plead guilty are already subject to the DNA-collecting statutes. The benefits 
of DNA collection from arrestees are insignificant since majority of them would be sibjecto to 
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DNA collecting statutes after conviction. This is best illustrated by U.S. v. Pool. 154 In that case 
an arrestee objected to the DNA sample taking and attacked the DNA Act on the Fourth 
Amendment grounds. After losing in the district court and in the Ninth Circuit~ defendant 
petitioned the panel for en bane review155• The review was granted but the day before the 
argument was scheduled defendant pleaded guilty in the initial case~ rendering the argument 
moot. 156 The panel canceled the review and withdrew the previous opinion, leaving the Ninth 
Circuit without a precedent.157 U.S. v. Pool indicates limited advantage of including arrestees 
into the database and an unnecessary waste of judicial resources in the litigations~ involving the 
DNA collection from the arrestees. 
The number of samples the government receives from arrestees that are later acquitted is very 
small based on how many cases even go to trial; the scope of DNA databases expansion to 
include arrestees is very limited.158 Since there is no significant benefit for the government it is 
not justified to expand DNA collection to arrestee because the DNA evidence will not disappear 
and the government will be able to collect it post-conviction. Benefits from DNA collecting prior 
to conviction are insignificant and do not justify an exception to the general prohibition of 
intrusions beyond body surfaces. 
Another commonly stated governmental interest is identification. The government interest in 
identifying who is in custody is a legitimate one. However, this reasoning is flawed. It attempts 
154 Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 reh'g en bane grante~ 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011) and vacated, 09-10303, 2011 WL 
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to mask investigation for the identification.159 First of all, DNA sample processing takes too long 
to serve as the means of identification. While the fingerprinting gives a response in ten minutes, 
the current processing time for the DNA sample is 31 calendar days. 160 The DNA sampling 
technology cannot serve as an adequate means of identification of the person in custody. This 
may not make a difference for the convicted felons who are likely to stay under the governmental 
supervision for more than thirty days, but this form of identification is not reasonable in the 
context of arrestees. It is not reasonable to keep someone under the supervision for 31 days just 
to identify who is at custody, when fingerprinting can provide a response to the same question in 
just ten minutes. Therefore, application of the DNA for the identification of arrestees is 
unreasonable. 
Government further asserts that identification means not only who the person is but also what 
did the person do. 161 However, finding what the person did is investigation rather than 
identification.162 As discussed above, investigation is not a significant governmental interest 
because suspicionless search does not justify bodily intrusions beyond the context of convicted 
felons. Therefore, government does not possess a significant interest in identification through the 
DNA sampling. The DNA technology does not provide adequate means of determining who the 
person is at the time of arrest. Identifying what the person did is investigation and investigation 
is not considered significant governmental interest. 
Additionally is desire to obtain federal funding in connection with the DNA collection might 
be driving states' legislatures to expand databases. 163 Due to a difficult economic situation the 
159 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772. 
160 !d. 
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states are increasingly looking for additional sources of income. By expanding the DNA 
databases they are trying to attract governmental funding for the maintenance of the forensic 
laboratories.164 The DNA Act offers funding to the laboratories that have a backlog of untested 
samples.165 This funding may be used not only for the actual testing of the DNA sample but for 
the maintenance of forensic laboratories, salaries of the personnel and research and 
development. 166 This creates an incentive for the states to keep the flow of untested samples to 
keep the federal money coming.167 This strategy results in creation of a constant backlog of 
samples by delaying processing some samples, including the samples from the crime scenes.168 
This somewhat undermines the stated goals of the DNA database creation, namely increase in 
the crime solving.169 Thus, DNA databases became a powerful tool for the States to obtain 
additional funding and do not necessarily contribute to the crime solving or identification. 
Governmental interest in obtaining additional funding by the means of intrusion into privacy is 
not a legitimate governmental interest in the context ofF ourth Amendment. 
Totality of the circumstances test balances individual expectations of privacy against the 
governmental interests. Arrestees' expectations of privacy are greater than those of convicted 
offenders and closer to those of the general public because of the presumption of innocence. 
There is no persuasive authority that arrestees have diminished expectations of privacy. On the 
other hand governmental interests in DNA collection of arrestees are weaker than in the context 
of convicted offenders. DNA technology at the present state cannot provide adequate means for 
identification of the offenders. Another governmental interest is in crime investigation. 
164 Id 
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Suspicionless intrusions beyond body surface are not permitted outside the context of convicted 
offenders. Finally, state legislatures may be driven by. financial motives in their desire to extend 
DNA databases, which is not a legitimate governmental interest in the context of privacy rights 
under the Fourth Amendment. In balancing arrestees' expectations of privacy against the 
governmental interests, the privacy expectations should prevail. DNA sampling of arrestees fails 
both the totality of the circumstances test and the special need test. Therefore, it should be 
declared unconstitutional. 
V. CONCLUSION 
DNA provides a useful tool for the crime investigation and law enforcement relies more and 
more on the DNA databases. Expanding use of DNA affects greater and greater categories of 
people, subjecting the DNA extraction to the Fourth Amendment challenges against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The most recent development of the state and federal law is 
to introduce mandatory DNA sampling of arrestees. It implicates Fourth Amendment's rights to 
a greater extent than mandatory DNA testing of the convicted felons. Warrantless searches 
absent individualized suspicion are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment unless they can satisfy 
either totality of the circumstances test or the special need test. DNA sampling of arrestees 
doesn't pass either the totality of the circumstances test or the special need test. Therefore, 
extension of the DNA collecting statutes to include arrestees should be declared unconstitutional. 
